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LONG TERM CARE IN THE POLITICAL BALANCE
Alison Barnes*
These comments serve to draw together some observations of
the experts - policy analysts, practitioners, and scholars- who
presented their research and analyses at Marquette University
Law School's 2007 Health and Elder Law Symposium. They also
seek to connect those points and others made in the excellent
papers published in this dedicated issue of Elder's Advisor, with
the larger social and political discussion of health and long term
care costs.
The Deficit Reduction Act of 2005 continued the long
history of squeezing off Medicaid eligibility for aged people
with disabilities who are not destitute. Those most affected are
elders who had steady modest incomes' and accumulated
savings and housing with any excess. The Medicaid eligibility
rules seek to utilize savings to pay for nursing facility care and
recover expenditures from the value of assets generally exempt
during the Medicaid recipient's lifetime, primarily the home.
The rules cannot penalize the spender, only the thrifty.
Arguably, they do not reach more affluent elders. As one
student (an affluent businessman, age 72) inquired (I paraphrase
him): Do you mean that if I set aside assets to cover five years of
nursing facility care (at $5,000 per month on average
* Alison Barnes is Professor of Law and teaches health and elder law,
disability law and trusts and estates at Marquette University Law
School.
1. The amount of an individual's Social Security benefit is based on the thirty-
five highest years of income, adjusted for inflation, an amount termed the PIA, or
primary insurance amount. LAWRENCE A. FROLIK & ALISON MCCHRYSTAL BARNES,
ELDER LAW CASES AND MATERIALS 171-172 (4th ed. 2007). References to ELDER LAW
CASES AND MATERIALS will be limited to a few points, though much of my thinking
on this topic is found there.
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nationwide, or $300,000) then the government will pay for my
nursing home care? That generally is correct, Medicaid
eligibility should be assured since sixty months is the length of
time states must examine the records of applicants to determine
whether applicants either gifted away assets or were receiving
income from undisclosed assets.
For the great majority, however, that set-aside is impossible.
The question becomes: How much savings is "too much" to
reserve from payment for nursing home care, and does society
wish to scrutinize why the elderly owner seeks to set it aside
from his or her support? 2  We report herein that the average
transfer in one study, made by one in eight applicants in an
affluent pool, was $46,000.3
We cannot lightly dismiss objections to Medicaid
planning-the legal and lawyer-facilitated practice of arranging
assets and income-in order to hasten partial state payments
and reduced monthly cost for nursing facility care.4 Objections
are raised effectively by many who also advocate taxpayer
rights, private sector reliance, and self-sufficiency as esteemed
personal values. Such independence is fundamental to a belief
structure of a group who might be apolitically termed
"individualists."
On the other hand, we cannot ignore or disparage those
whose values emphasize interdependence as essential to society.
We don't individually maintain the infrastructure for health or
other public goods. Neither can we concede, contrary to
evidence, that Medicaid planning causes substantial economic
2. Ellen O'Brien's presentation reported the observations of Maryland Rep.
Roscoe Bartlett's roundtable discussion (Republican, MD. 6"' Cong. Dist.) that
surely one's habit of tithing to one's church would not be counted against a
Medicaid applicant. See Ellen O'Brien, What is Wrong with the Long-term Care
Reforms of the Deficit Reduction Act of 2005?, 9 ELDER'S ADVISOR 103, 110 (2007).
However, the rules do not assess the acceptability of gifting according to the
worthiness of the gift recipient.
3. See id. at 116.
4. I distinguish here the practices permitted by statute, which might, in some
circumstances, trigger a period of ineligibility for government payment and
payment structure, as opposed to actions subject to civil or criminal action for
fraud.
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losses from government revenues. The Kaiser Family
Foundation Commission on Medicaid and the Uninsured
reports that if all assets transferred by aged Medicaid applicants
were identified, they would total about 1% of state Medicaid
long term care budgets.5 But denying Medicaid eligibility to the
elderly ill would have a substantial impact on expenditures. 6 A
related, non-quantitative question is whether moral opprobrium
is due for individuals who seek to arrange their assets or income
to access a benefit according to government rules.
I have long asserted that much objection to the cluster of
financial choices termed "Medicaid planning" arises from the
fact that Medicaid originates as a program for the poor.
Dealings with the poor are sometimes excessively and
destructively paternalistic. That is, government says "tell me
everything and fully comply these rules, and we will tell you
what you get". This model of citizen/government interaction is
a poor fit for the prudent middle class elder of modest means
who seeks, above all, to maximize security for self and family.
The Medicaid planning stakes are highest for this elder citizen.
The current status of government long term care benefits is
hardly clear policy, but appears to be a reserved endorsement of
assistance to the middle class Widespread lack of conviction
about that help arises, I think, from the belief that most people
can save and plan for their expenses in old age. This is mostly
true, people can and do save if only in the form of restricted
access retirement accounts including Social Security taxes. But it
ignores the small minority of elders who have great, often
medicalized needs, and few informal ways to meet them.
The need for long term care support arises because of a
number of changes to life patterns and economics that took place
5. See Kaiser Family Foundation Daily Health Policy Report, Medicaid: States
Becoming More Aggressive in Medicaid Estate Recovery Programs, Jan. 2, 2007
(citing AARP Public Policy Institute, which reported that only 8 states received
more than 1% of their budgets in estate recovery revenues), http://www.kaisemet
work.org/daily-reports/rep-index.cfm?hint-3&DRID=41870.
6. See generally, Kaiser Family Foundation, Medicaid's Long Term Care
Beneficiaries: An Analysis of Spending Patterns (2006).
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over recent decades, mostly without widespread recognition.
First, longer lives and smaller families mean that some have
fewer in the younger generation who are or would be burdened
with extended periods of care. Confusingly, this is a
generalization with contradictions, since lower infant and early
adult mortality means that elders who had many children have a
huge number of potential family caregivers. Second, the transfer
of wealth from generation to generation has shifted with the
move from family farming and businesses to a pattern of
extended, parent-supported education as key to the success of
the next generation. Wealth is no longer the family's land or
work; rather it is financial and emotional support for post-
secondary education. The third factor reflects the shift implied
by factor two, from a small-production to a wage-based
economy, with supply of many specific, current goods acquired
only with cash rather than approximations of those goods
generally acquired through barter and waiting. One aspect of
the change is the number of family members who earn wages
and whose earnings are considered necessary to maintain the
family, leaving few available for home care of the old and the
sick.
Another aspect of the shift in long term care from a home-
like family matter to a concern of business and government is
the growth of costs in health care and increasingly-medicalized
long term care. Health care goods are increasingly expensive
and, if needed in quantity, cost more than many individuals can
or should reasonably save to finance.
One can envision that those who fail to plan to pay for long
term nursing facility care although they can7 may also reflect
7. Affordability and the ability to save for retirement expense is inherently
difficult to assess because of many variables of income, costs of education for self
and family, health-related expenses, geographic region, and personal expectations.
However, doomsaying about the lack of adequate savings and urging each earner
to save as much as possible has recently been criticized as erroneous and
counterproductive. See, e.g., Damon Darlin, A Contrarian View: Save Less and Still
Retire with Enough, N. Y. TIMES, Jan. 27, 2007 at Al; Gayle B. Ronan, Is there really a
retirement savings crisis? MSNBC.com, Oct. 30, 2007, http://www.msnbc.msn.com
/id/20296654/.
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some fundamental beliefs beyond that the nursing facility
should be there to receive them regardless of their ability to pay.
One such belief may be that the likelihood of a long-term,
seriously debilitating condition is either remote or
unimaginable. It is unclear why such a belief might be
widespread, whether because disability that interferes with
major life activities can be deferred through medical technology,
or because disability income and widespread anti-begging
ordinances make health-caused poverty invisible, or individual
experience of an older person with chronic disabilities is
otherwise very limited.
Another "belief" is that nursing facility care is an unwanted
good that can be avoided, so the risk of need is not worthy of
planning. Such a view of nursing facility care contrasts with the
general view of health care, so planning may differ.' A
suggested explanation is that we want to be assured (non-
budget busting) health care when we are ill in order to get better
and leave need behind. This pattern does not reflect the needs of
chronically impaired elders, although they may improve and be
free of the burdens of devoting most of their time to health. To
some extent, it denies reality although the need for chronic care
is reality for a small minority. That is, it denies reality for the
significant few.
Another widespread belief is that nursing facility care must
be avoided by all means. The stereotype was captured in the
animated television show The Simpsons, in which the greedy
and malicious casino owner Mr. Burns is shut down! His
employees - card sharks, cheats and bottom-dealers - manage a
nursing home!' The nursing home industry continues to assert
that its image problems are caused by a few bad apples, while
statistics indicate that nursing aide staffing in most facilities is
8. Richard L. Kaplan, Financing Long-Term Care in the United States: Who Should
Pay for Mom and Dad?, in AGING: CARING FOR OUR ELDERS 74-75 (David N. Weisstub
et al., eds., 2001).
9. Eric M. Carlson, Seige Mentality: How the Defensive Attitude of the Long-Term
Care Industry is Perpetuating Poor Care and an Even Poorer Image, 31 McGEORGE L.
REV. 749, n. 9 (1999) (episode viva Ned Flanders).
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inadequate for all the basic hands-on care required by the
number of facility residents. In a dismaying recent report, the
staffing at investor-owned nursing facilities is shown to drop
sharply and the well being of residents to suffer with suffering
and early deaths.1 0 Profit taking and the intensive work of
human care apparently are incompatible.
Fears about a bad and costly end of life play out in politics
and business on Medicaid eligibility for the middle class, in part
for historical reasons. Medicaid is an errant growth from the
social conscience that raised all boats in the 1950s and the Great
Society of the 1960s. As early as 1950, Congress allocated grants
to the states to pay for health care for states' poor citizens. Other
government involvement in health care was resisted by
organized medicine which feared unnecessary interference and
the health insurance industry which found a lively business in
employer-based health insurance for returning veterans of
World War II.
A most intense debate was about responding to the needs of
the one-third of elders living in poverty in an era predating the
annual cost of living adjustment to Social Security income
payments. In May 1965, with a shift of representation in
Congress and other political regrouping, the opportunity for
nationwide health care programs appeared. Almost all debate
centered on the coverage that would become Medicare, yet in
July 1965, with little discussion, Congress also institutionalized
the payment formula and benefits that would become Medicaid.
States could, by submitting plans that met federal rules,
such as statewide availability of services, patient choice of
providers and continuity over a period of years, receive federal
funds of 50% to 80% to match their own spending for health care
for the poor. Mirroring Medicare, the services states must
provide included only skilled nursing facility care as a long-term
care service. Less intensive nursing home care was deemed
optional, at the discretion of each state. However, states that
9. Charles Duhigg, At Many Homes, More Profit, Less Nursing, N.Y. TIMES, Sept.
23, 2007, at 1A.
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chose initially to provide only skilled care found that they paid
higher "skilled" rates for elders who could not stay home
because of a lack of family support or poor housing that caused
serious health problems for impaired elders.
The four-decade Medicaid long term care evolution that
followed included waivers of the fundamental federal rules to
allow, on a state or locality basis, home care for those who
would be eligible for nursing facility placement, demonstrations
packaging intensive community-based health and long term care
services, and Medicaid payment for "assisted living" so fewer
elders need nursing facility care. All seek the most cost-effective
way to meet the needs of disabled elders."
In the meantime, the cost of health care and more intensive
medicalized long-term care services has risen dramatically. An
individual who has the misfortune to need substantial care finds
her savings rapidly consumed.
Yet insurance coverage, particularly for long term care, is in
its prolonged, troubled immaturity. Insurance generally suffers
from the widespread troubles of greed by both seller and buyer.
Moral hazard, adverse selection, underwriting and various
forms of reunderwriting, and overly aggressive marketing have
created small risk pools protected only by stop-loss insurance
(i.e., insurance to prevent disastrous loss on the major policy
risk). All these factors intervene in the original concept,
according to which all with risk of loss pooled a reasonable sum
to be paid to the unlikely sufferer of major loss. Long term care
insurance seeks to play all the actuarial games, and has indeed
early distinguished its ability to fend off claims.12 Meanwhile,
long term care insurers are likely to collect premiums for
decades before a policyholder makes a claim. The most likely
11. Nursing facility care of skilled and other levels is now a required Medicaid
service, however, states have set various rates of payment that encourage or
discourage care for patients of varying intensity of need. Further freedom of choice
to deny nursing facility eligibility is provided by the DRA. See generally Gene
Coffey, Narrowing Medicaid's LTC Coverage? The Implications of the DRA's Home and
Community-Based Care Benefit, 9 ELDER'S ADVISOR 131 (2007).
12. Charles Duhigg, Aging, Frail and Fighting Insurers to Pay Up, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 26, 2007 at Al (part of the series Golden Opportunities, Long-Term Trouble).
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end of the individual policy is lapse without payout.
Some individualists look to adult children to pay for their
parents' care. Thirty-three states have filial responsibility laws
that allow an indigent parent to sue an adult child for support.
Admittedly, few cases illustrate the appropriate applications of
such laws. Many find the idea anywhere on a continuum from
impractical to repugnant. Compelling behavior within the
family has been associated with the risk of abuse.
That last objection may not currently apply, however,
opening the possibility for intergenerational support on a family,
rather than societal, basis. 13 Formerly, the opportunity for
mistreatment arose when the unwilling family took in an elder.
Until the economic changes around World War II, the location of
care typically would be the family farm or town homestead,
where goods might be scarce but need for household work was
never in short supply. Now, we are in a money economy with
over 25% of households of just one person, many of whom are
older. The message of the statutes now, therefore, is "just send
money," without significant opportunity for undetected abusive
treatment. The model for enforcement, should society choose to
adopt it, is a registry with interstate tracking similar to the
system for child support.
The newest filial responsibility law therefore is worth a
look. Pennsylvania, which had repealed its old law, enacted a
new one in 2006.14 The Pennsylvania statute conditions the
child's obligation on a finding by the court of excess income, and
requires that a percentage of that excess be paid for a needy
parent's basic care, including medical expenses. This could
include housing, food, and medical expenses. It is well thought
out, regardless of whether one agrees with the underlying
13. See generally Seymour Moskowitz, Adult Children and Indigent Parents:
Intergenerational Responsibilities in International Perspective, 86 MARQ. L. REV. 401, 402
(2002) (regarding filial responsibility statutes in the states).
14. 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 4603 (West 2006). Subsection (b)(2) provides that
the amount "for medical assistance ... other than public nursing home care ... The
amount of assistance is to be the lesser of ... six times the excess of the liable
individual's average monthly income over the amount required for the reasonable
support of the liable individual ... (or) the cost of medical assistance."
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premise.
Notably, however, the statute does not require the adult
child to contribute for nursing facility expenses if the parent is
eligible for such Medicaid placement. That is, the state will pay
for nursing home care according to complex rules of income and
asset eligibility similar to those in other states. The cost of the
care is implicitly acknowledged, even by determined
individualist-minded legislators, to be different in type and
magnitude. The adult child who otherwise must provide
support for the poor parent can leave that bill to the state and its
taxpayers.
The time when Medicaid long term care was a program for
the poor has passed. Our speakers talk about health and long
term care as parts of a whole, regardless of the mechanisms
triggering government benefits. 5 Some strategies for achieving
Medicaid eligibility have been created by Congress, such as the
Miller (or Medicaid Qualified Income) Trust 6. Some are
acknowledged by the states, such as special needs trusts 7 and
use of annuities to convert assets into an income stream and
thereby achieve eligibility and slow the rate of spending on long
term care by triggering the Medicaid rate of payment to the
nursing facility.1
All such strategies are allowed in order to address the
conceptual and practical problems of Medicaid long term care
15. Medicare, the national health care program for the elderly and disabled, has
always been "community rated", charging each beneficiary the same premium if
fully insured for Part A - Hospital Insurance or eligible for Part B - Supplemental
Medical Insurance. The Medicare Modernization Act of 2003 created means-tested
premiums for Medicare Part B, and recent Senate initiatives propose means-tested
premiums for Medicare D - Prescription Drug Plans. See, e.g., Jonathan Weisman,
Higher Medicare premiums considered (reprinted from the WASHINGTON POST)
MILWAUKEE JOURNAL SENTINEL, Oct. 5, 2007, at A6 (Senator John Ensign (R-NV)
proposes to attach provisions to means-test drug plan premiums to any available
legislation, noting that "working couples with incomes over $160,000 should not be
subsidized by retired firefighters or schoolteachers").
16. 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(d)(4)(B) (Westlaw current through November 20, 2007).
17. § 1396p(d)(4)(C). A special needs trust for a beneficiary over age 65 when
the trust is created must be administered by the state or a private non-profit
designated by the state as acceptable to the Medicaid program.
18. 42 U.S.C. § 1396c (Westlaw current through November 20, 2007).
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eligibility as extended to the non-destitute. They acknowledge
that it is incoherent to cause an elderly person to literally spend
everythingl 9 they have worked for in order to trigger Medicaid
nursing home benefits, while they live, know of their inevitably
tenuous financial and personal circumstances, and have only a
tiny monthly allowance from their income for all non-Medicaid
expenses.20 It is incoherent because prudent people of modest
means and savings are most greatly burdened. Those who earn
much but spend most profligately are destitute at the time of
application, and therefore accepted as eligible.
Another response calls for encouraging widespread use of
long term care insurance. It is an apparently prudent idea
because long term care is an "insurable event" of potentially
very high costs that will be incurred by very few. Such an
insurance pool could work. However, the hype for the product
is generated in significant part by the insurance industry itself,
denying the high cost and problems with coverage that make
long term care policies unsuited to many people. First, the costs
are high because the pool is small and may be tainted by moral
hazard, i.e., older people who anticipate long term care needs
choose coverage. On the other hand, those who buy coverage
while they are young and premiums are relatively low are likely
to allow a policy to lapse and receive nothing for their
premiums. Second, private long term care insurance is a
product that unfortunately incorporates many of the most
dysfunctional aspects of insurance, including the splintering of
risk pools, cherry-picking of healthier applicants and rejection of
others, aggressive marketing at low prices to achieve market
share with unwarranted post-claims denials, and some
19. Medicaid eligibility is determined by the states within federal guidelines.
However, the rule of thumb for assets that can be retained by a single Medicaid
applicant is $2,000. Certain other assets, notably the homestead if the individual
has an expectation of returning, are exempt from the eligibility calculation, though
subject to recovery from the individual's estate.
20. The monthly personal needs allowance from individual income is $35 - $45
in most states, though the minimum allowed under federal law is $30. High cost
states such as Alaska and Hawaii allow as much as $85 for all expenses outside of
the housing, food and shelter covered by Medicaid.
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providers who simply scam their purchasers. It is difficult to
determine whether addressing all such problems through
regulation would cause insurers to withdraw their products as
unprofitable.
A worrisome aspect of Deficit Reduction Act changes is the
option for the states, as related by Gene Coffey in this issue, 21 to
opt for home care for elders sufficiently impaired as to need
nursing facility care. That is to say, the state might make the
choice against nursing home care. An elder in such condition
will not be going home to live alone, but must have caregiver(s),
family or others.
That is a recipe for neglect and abuse if the caregivers are
unwilling. We know what home care for seriously disabled
people looks like when caregivers are willing, as recorded in
such classics as The 36-Hour Day,2 2 as the relentless
requirements of a home resident might not remember meals or
other interactions immediately past, or might cry out constantly
around the clock. The emphasis of the U.K. on home care,
significantly budget-driven, provides reports of the results of
such home care placements: Families severely disrupted, unable
to care effectively for themselves, much less for a person with
serious disability and need.
In sum, the response to the state option is that institutions
are, in some instances, the good option. Nursing facilities are
good when they are needed. They need to be well-run by caring
and conscientious people, and inhabitated only by those who
need them.
Health care and long term care are for many purposes now
one, unitary. The health care component dwarfs the room-and-
board component when significant care is needed, but the
growing use of variations on assisted living - traditionally
nonmedical residential care - can offer living standards above
20. See generally Coffey, supra note 11.
21. NANCY L. MACE, THE 36-HOUR DAY: A FAMILY GUIDE TO CARING FOR
PEOPLE WITH ALZHEIMER'S DISEASE, OTHER DEMENTIAS, AND MEMORY Loss IN
LATER LIFE (4 1 ed. 2006).
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the minimum, even for those who qualify under a Medicaid
assisted living waiver.2 3 We know that we need to correct health
insurance, and that long term care coverage should be included
in any solution. Because many believe that they will never need
long term care, it is particularly important that coverage be
universal, that all should have it. This is a better answer than
the DRA, which simply squeezes off benefits for prudent people
of modest income and with perhaps difficult circumstances late
in life.
This choice would end a culture of fear of need with little
chance of good care and appropriate choices of services, such as
a well-run facility near former residence or family. It would cut
resources needed for marketing and administering competing
insurance plans and much of the waste of the resources benignly
called "coordination of benefits" of various possible payers.
Eligibility would not become simple, the great advantage of
the Social Security program and its derivative Medicare
coverage. Rather, arguments about eligibility would shift from
income and assets to health/disability status, i.e., the need for the
care sought. Some would, out of need or frugality, seek any
type of care with minimal out of pocket costs in terms of
deductibles and copayments. Much state choice might be
provided, preserving the Medicaid legacy, creating different
treatment of elders according to their home locations. Such
incremental change does not create a perfect match of need and
care.
Advocacy of elder lawyers for clients shows that the status
quo causes deprivation and distress. Change is possible. The
reconception of more intensive, medicalized forms of long term
care as health care is key.
23. See, e.g., Mulder v. S. Dakota Dep't. of Social Services, 675 N.W. 2d 212 (S.D.
2003) (see especially the dissent: state allowance for assisted living, for which
Mulder qualified, is $993 per month, which is paid for eligible persons who choose
an assisted living facility that charges more. The balance must come from other
funds, such as those of adult children).
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